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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS TO GATHER NEWS
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the United States Supreme Court's hint of acquiescence in
Branzburg v. Hayes,' the lower courts had generally recognized a first
amendment right of the press to gather information otherwise available
to the public. 2 However, the courts, including the Branzburg Court, agreed
that there existed no unrestrained right on the part of the press or the
public to gather news ;3 for example, newsreporters may not claim a right
to attend judicial conferences, executive sessions of official bodies, or
scenes of crime or disaster.4 Beyond these simple strictures, however, the
contours of the news gathering right remain vague. It is not clear what
the permissible restrictions on the press are when there is public access
to information. Nor is it clear whether the press has a special right of
access to information not otherwise available to the public.5 Finally, given
a right to gather news - perhaps even a right of special access - no
constitutional definition of "the press" has evolved in order to enable one
to determine exactly who it is who enjoys such a right.
The reluctance of the courts to recognize distinctly a news gathering
right in the press stems from a valid concern with administrative problems
and from the logical necessity of making the determination of what con-
stitutes the press for the purposes of constitutional protection.6 If the
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Branzburg Court held that newsreporters and
journalists do not have a constitutionally based privilege to refuse to disclose their
confidential sources when summoned before a grand jury. Id. at 690-91. However, in
reaching this conclusion the Court stated, "Nor is it suggested that newsgathering
does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
2. See, e.g., Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186 (D.R.I. 1950)
(conditioning right of press to inspect public tax records on the obtaining of express
permission of city council is impermissible abridgment of freedom of press). Compare
Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1959) (press has no right to inspect
documents not open to public generally).
3. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) ; Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972) ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965);
Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
4. 408 U.S. at 684-85.
5. See generally Hurst, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 181 (1973), for a discussion of the desirability
of a constitutional right of special access for the protection of the underground press
against government discrimination.
6. In responding to the newsreporters' claim to a conditional privilege for mem-
bers of the press, the Supreme Court in Branzburg stated:
The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be
(189)
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right is merely coextensive with a public right to gather news, then con-
ceptually the press may go only where the public may go. However, if
the right is peculiar to the press, it would seem to follow that reporters
would have access to many more areas than the public. Therefore, in
delimiting the class of persons with such access, the practical problems in
defining "the press" appear substantial. The language of the courts sug-
gests an adherence to the first approach, but their application of consti-
tutional principles to real facts occasionally suggests the emergence of the
latter.
This note will explore both the recent developments in the judicial
evolution of a right to gather news and the practical problems which may
arise if courts continue to recognize and expand this arguably new first
amendment protection.
II. THE NEWSREPORTER'S PRIVILEGE TO WITHHOLD THE
IDENTITY OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court acknowledged a news gathering
right, but deftly avoided elaboration.7 The Court found that the state's
substantial interest in the administration of a criminal investigation out-
weighed any claim of privilege based upon freedom of the press asserted
by a journalist called to testify before a grand jury.8 The operating premise
underlying the holding was that the denial of a privilege to newsreporters
resulted in only an incidental burden on the press ;9 the inhibition of the
flow of news to the public was at best uncertain. 10 On the narrow facts
necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege,
a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the
press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeo-
graph just as much as the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest
photocomposition methods.
408 U.S. at 703-04 (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 681. See note I supra.
8. 408 U.S. at 690-91.
9. Id. at 682. The plaintiffs argued that the actions of the defendant officials
could be justified only by a "compelling" or "paramount" public interest served by
narrowly drawn means having no unnecessary impact on the exercise of freedom of
speech, press or association. Id. at 680-81 (citations omitted). Rejecting this claim,
the Court asserted that, unlike in the cases upon which the plaintiffs relied, the instant
facts "involve[d] no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restric-
tion on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press
publish what it prefers to withhold." Id. at 681. This distinction between prior re-
straint on publishing and limitations on newsgathering activity is consistent with a
judicial inclination to equate, under the general rubric of freedom of expression,
freedom of the press and freedom of speech; it has been suggested that the failure
or reluctance to distinguish between the two constitutional guarantees has limited the
protective reach of the first amendment to the distribution and publishing aspects of
journalism. Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
838, 839-43 (1971). The posture of some lower courts towards the press' newsgather-
ing claims supports this conclusion. See notes 15-24 and accompanying text infra.
10. 408 U.S. at 690. The Court was particularly impressed with what it regarded
as the uncertain nature of the burden. Id. Specifically, it was unpersuaded that news-
reporters' confidential sources would dry up as a consequence of compelling testimony
at grand jury proceedings. Id. at 694.
[VOL. 20
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before it, the Court fashioned a per se rule" with respect to a news-
reporter's claim of privilege before a grand jury. Anticipating overwhelm-
ing administrative consequences, 12 the Court rejected an ad hoc approach
based upon the conditional privilege desired by the petitioners."3 In addi-
tion, it regarded the eventual necessity of defining categories of the press
to which the privilege would be available as conflicting with traditional
notions of the scope of first amendment protections. 14
Lower courts have been reluctant to apply the per se approach of
Branzburg in other contexts. Within a few months of the Branzburg
decision, the Second Circuit, in Baker v. F & F Investment,1" declined
to extend the Supreme Court's holding to civil actions. 6 Instead, it
adopted the balancing approach sought but rejected in Branzburg.'7 The
court observed that in Branzburg the overriding interest inherent in a
criminal investigation was "the safety of the person and the property of
the citizen.' 8 That interest, it asserted, was not necessarily present in
a civil action.19 Furthermore, on the facts, since the reporter claiming the
privilege was not a party to the action, and since there were other avail-
able sources for the sought-after information possessed by the reporter,
the Baker court determined that the newsreporter's disclosure was not
essential to the public interest.20 Thus, under the balancing test adopted
in Baker, the interest of a private party in compelled disclosure of a
11. Finding that subpoenas served on newsreporters to testify before a grand jury
were constitutionally valid, regardless of whether confidential sources would have to
be disclosed thereby, the Court issued a flat denial of newsreporters' claim of privilege.
Id. at 682-88, 699-705. See Hurst, supra note 5, at 186-87.
12. 408 U.S. at 703-04. See note 6 supra.
13. The reporters sought a qualified rather than an absolute privilege, which
would necessitate determination on a case-by-case basis. They claimed that they
could not, within the protections of the Constitution, be compelled to testify in judicial
proceedings unless there. were sufficient grounds for believing that they possessed
information relevant to the crime being investigated, that the information was un-
available from other sources, and that the need for the information was sufficiently
compelling to override the abridgment of the first amendment rights that would result
from compelled disclosure. 408 U.S. at 680.
14. 408 U.S. at 704 (citations omitted). See notes 5 & 6 supra.
15. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
16. 407 F.2d at 780-81. On an interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit upheld
the district court's refusal to compel a journalist to disclose at deposition the identity
of a real estate agent from whom he had learned of certain "block-busting" techniques
which subsequently became the subject of a magazine article. The pending civil action
involved allegations of racial discrimination in the sale of houses in the Chicago area. Id.
17. Id. at 783. See note 13 supra.
18. Id. at 783, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
19. 470 F.2d at 784.
20. Id. at 783. The court's emphasis of the fact that the claimant was not a party
to the suit stemmed from its earlier ruling that a defendant newsreporter in a libel
action may claim no privilege where his confidential sources go to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim and are unavailable elsewhere. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
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journalist's confidential sources was outweighed by the public interest
in nondisclosure.
21
The same result was reached in civil actions arising out of the Water-
gate break-in of 1972. In Democratic National Committee v. McCord,22
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recognized
a qualified privilege to gather news in personnel of various publications
who refused at deposition to reveal their sources.23 The court held that,
absent a showing that alternative sources of evidence had been exhausted,
or a positive showing of materiality of documents and other materials
sought, a claim of constitutional privilege would be recognized. 24
The court in McCord distinguished United States v. Liddy,25 which
held that the right of an accused to a fair trial in a criminal case out-
weighed any claim of privilege based upon freedom of the press. 26 It
observed that considerations in a criminal proceeding, such as that before
the Liddy court, are vastly different from those presented in civil dis-
covery.2 7
However, in a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in which the court suspended for three days the
denial of a motion to stay execution of a contempt order stemming from the
Liddy case,28 Judge Leventhal, who would have extended the denial of the
stay for 14 days, took the opportunity to invoke a balancing test not unlike
that in Baker. While he read the principles elucidated in Branzburg as
21. The Branzburg opinion attempted to minimize the severity of the burden
upon newsgathering occasioned by compelled disclosure by labelling it "uncertain."
See note 10 supra. Baker, however, was silent on the question of whether such dis-
closure impermissibly burdened newsgathering. However, one may infer from its
adoption of the balancing approach that the court accepted the assertion that a first
amendment right had been directly abridged.
22. 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
23. Id. at 1399. This action was upon motions to quash 10 subpoenas issued on
behalf of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, the Finance Committee
to Reelect the President, and their respective chairmen who were parties in civil
actions arising out of the June 17, 1972 break-in at the Watergate offices of the Demo-
cratic National Committee in Washington, D.C. The subpoenas summoned reporters
and personnel of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Star-
News, and Time magazine to appear for depositions and to bring numerous docu-
ments, photos, and tapes relating to the break-in. Id. at 1397-98.
24. Id. at 1398.
25. 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972). This action arose upon a motion to quash
a subpoena duces tecum issued on behalf of Gordon Liddy and others to the bureau
chief of the Los Angeles Times to produce materials in his possession relating to
interviews with a certain party who was to be a key government witness against
Liddy at trial. Id. at 209-10.
26. Id. at 215. The Liddy opinion echoed the Branzburg Court's observation that
the alleged burden on newsgathering was speculative. Id. See note 10 supra. How-
ever, it did evince some uncertainty by noting that the facts were unique and that, in
any event, the safeguards sought in Branzburg, though not required, had been afforded.
Id. at 216. See note 13 supra.
27. 356 F. Supp. at 1398.
28. United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court suspended
denial of the stay to permit application to the Supreme Court for certiorari, the stay
to continue if the petition were granted. Id. at 586.
[VOL. 20
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applicable to criminal proceedings, he also stated that the Supreme Court's
holding did not abrogate the need in each instance to weigh the importance
of compelled testimony against the consequential burden upon news-
gathering. 29 However, he asserted, while the secrecy of grand jury pro-
ceedings offers adequate protection for press representatives' rights, a
criminal proceeding does not afford the same safeguards.A0 Therefore,
Judge Leventhal would have ordered an in camera determination of whether,
on the facts, compelled disclosure was essential to the administration of
justice.31
Similarly, in State v. St. Peter,32 the Supreme Court of Vermont
held that a news reporter was entitled to refuse to reveal sources in a
deposition proceeding in a criminal case unless the individual conducting
the examination could show that there was no other available source of
the information and that it was relevant to resolving the guilt or innocence
of the defendant in the case. 33 The court compared the newsreporter's
privilege to that given to the prosecution, enabling it to withhold the name
of an informer provided it was not relevant to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. 34 There, the "free flow of criminal intelligence into police
hands" was balanced against the constitutional right of the defendant to
be confronted by the witnesses against him.3 5 A similar balance could
therefore be struck between the defendant's rights and the newsreporter's
first amendment freedoms.36
To the extent that lower courts have departed from the per se approach
of Branzburg and have granted a "qualified privilege" to press repre-
sentatives, it would seem that they have recognized a distinct news-
gathering right in the press. Once a balancing test is applied on an ad hoc
basis, the possibility arises that compelling disclosure by newsreporters
of their confidential sources is not "essential to protect the public interest
in the orderly administration of justice in the courts," 37 thereby challenging
the proposition that newsreporters are entitled to no more protection in
their news gathering than the average citizen.
The language of the post-Branzburg cases suggests that the courts
are responding equivocally to the claim of a special constitutional pro-
tection for the press when it is seeking news. Such a claim is one which
is not merely coextensive with the broad protections normally associated
with freedom of expression; it is in addition to the limited right of the
public to know or have access to information about or through the
government.
29. Id. at 587.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 588.
32 ......... Vt ........ 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974).
33. Id. at 256.
34. Id., citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
35. 315 A.2d at 256.
36. Id.
37. 356 F. Supp. at 1398.
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III. THE PRESS' ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM PRISON INMATES
The prisoner interview cases have held generally that a flat ban on
all press communications with consenting inmates constitutes an imper-
missible abridgment of freedom of the press. s8 As a result, the pivotal
question has become what mode of access is constitutionally protected.
On the issue of press demands for face-to-face interviews with willing
prisoners, the United States Supreme Court has held recently in the
companion cases, Pell v. Procunier39 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,40
that a flat ban on particular interviews requested by the press is not an
unconstitutional abridgment of the first amendment right to freedom of
the press.41 Reaffirming the traditional theory that the press enjoys no
greater right of access to information than does the general public, the
Court found in both cases that since the general public is not admitted
to prisons, the press cannot complain of constitutional injury.42 According
to the Court, although certain persons were permitted to speak with
specific inmates, these discrete categories of persons did not constitute
"the public" for the purposes of discovering the parameters of press rights.43
In so doing, the Court declined the opportunity presented by lower court
opinions to develop a flexible approach to press news gathering claims.
The court of appeals in the Washington Post case had affirmed44 a
holding that a blanket prohibition of face-to-face interviews with willing
inmates was unconstitutional. 4 5 The court rejected the defendants' argu-
38. Saxbe v. Washington Post. Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) ; Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974) ; Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 1973) ; McMillan v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1974) ; Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst, 364 F. Supp. 719, 730 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
39. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
40. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
41. Id. at 828; id. at 849. In Pell, the regulations of the California Department
of Corrections pertaining to visitations were promulgated during a disruptive prisoner
strike at the maximum security prison housing the plaintiff prisoners. While the press
was denied interviews with specific individual inmates, reporters were permitted to
interview randomly selected prisoners and to maintain contact through written corre-
spondence. Id. at 819. In Washington Post, the regulations of the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, applicable to minimum and maximum security prisons, were substantially
the same as those challenged in Pell. Id. at 847.
42. Id. at 819; id. at 849-50.
43. In both cases, the regulations permitted personal interviews with inmates'
families, friends, attorneys, and religious counsel. Id. at 2813, 2814.
44. 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
45. 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972). On appeal to the Supreme Court, however,
the Court stressed that the privileges of the press available under the federal regula-
tions, i.e., prison tours and random interviews, exceeded those accorded members of
the general public. 94 S. Ct. at 2813. In Pell, prior to the promulgation of the dis-
puted California rule, the press was permitted face-to-face interviews with willing
prisoners of their choice. The Court observed that this was a privilege specially
reserved for the press and that, therefore, its elimination did not constitute discrimi-
nation. Id. at 2809. 6
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ments that correspondence and prison tours for the press were adequate
protections of a newsgathering right4 6 and that, further, the restrictions
were necessitated by the "big-wheel" phenomenon.
4 7
Noting that the first amendment requires that administrative decisions
regarding a requested interview "respond more precisely to the particular
evils posed by that request, '48 the circuit court in Washington Post found
that the legitimate interests in prison security and discipline did not
necessitate a total ban on prison interviews.49 It postulated that an inter-
view could be prohibited "only where it is the judgment of the adminis-
trator directly concerned, based on either the demonstrated behavior of
the inmate, or special conditions existing at the time the interview is
requested, or both, that the interview presents a serious risk of adminis-
trative or disciplinary problems."
50
Similarly, in H'duston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst,5 ' a
blanket proscription of all personal interviews was held invalid as over-
broad and vague. 52 The Houston Chronicle court found that the case did
not present an instance where the press was being precluded from gathering
information "not available to the public generally ... for the simple reason
that certain members of the general public, to wit, friends, family, and at-
torneys, are for good reason allowed into the jails for the purpose of seeing
their inmates face-to-face." 53 The other prisoner interview cases54 seem
46. 494 F.2d at 1001-03. In his dissent in the Supreme Court's decision in
Washington Post, Justice Powell pointed out that testimony presented at an evidentiary
hearing at the district court level tended to show that "personal interviews are
crucial to effective reporting in the prison context" and that random conversations,
prison tours and written correspondence are inadequate substitutes. 417 U.S. at 853
(Powell, J., dissenting).
47. Id. Defendants argued that when certain inmates who exert considerable
power and influence within the institution are interviewed by the press the conse-
quential increase in their visibility and status enhances their ability to encourage
other inmates to follow disruptive paths. Id. The argument was rejected at trial:
"The 'big wheel' justification cannot .. .be used to stifle expression . . . and certainly
it goes too far afield to blanket all federal prisoners under this rhetoric for the obvious
purpose of stultifying dissent." 357 F. Supp. at 781.
48. 494 F.2d at 1005.
49. Id. at 1002, 1005.
50. Id. at 1006. Adopting essentially the same view, Justice Powell noted that the
Federal Bureau of Prisons had not shown that it could not deal with disruptive "big
wheels" by precautions specifically designed for that purpose and he observed in-
cidentally that other prison systems have successfully permitted personal interviews
and have provided for individual evaluation of interview requests. 417 U.S. at 868
(Powell, J., dissenting).
51. 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
52. Id. at 730-31.
53. Id. at 725. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this logic in Pell. While
acknowledging the extensive visitation privileges which California prisons granted
certain categories of persons, the Court took the position that such persons have either
a professional or personal relationship to the inmates which prison officials may rea-
sonably deem vital in the achievement of rehabilitation of prisoners. In the view of
the Court, the press does not share this function. 417 U.S. at 825.
54. McMillan v. Carlson, 369 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1217
(1st Cir. 1974); Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C.
7
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to have adopted the Houston Chronicle rationale that the press' news-
gathering right arises solely because other members of the public are
admitted. 55
The results in those two cases56 suggest that simply because some
categories of the public are admitted on a limited basis, the press, as a
discrete group, shall also be admitted on the same limited basis. The press
obtained a right of access not only where the general public was admitted,
but also where access was otherwise available only to certain categories of
unspecified individuals. Thus, without having to make the difficult deter-
mination, in the face of increasing public and press interest, of whether
the press has an absolute right of access to prison inmates,5 7 these courts
fashioned a workable rule which recognized a newsgathering role unique
to the press, but which may be limited by the factual circumstances. While
this approach was rejected by the Supreme Court in the context of prisoner
interviews,5 8 it may yet find application in other instances of press claims
to a right of special access to information.
IV. THE PRESS' ACCESS TO LEGISLATIVE PRESS GALLERIES
The newsgathering right has been asserted recently by representatives
of the press who were denied access to the periodical gallery of the United
1972), aff'd, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) ; Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d
1062 (9th Cir. 1973).
55. In his dissent to Pell and Washington Post, Justice Douglas apparently
accepted the majority's view that the grant of the interview privilege to certain cate-
gories of persons is but an exception to the general rule that the public is to be
excluded from prisons. However, Douglas opined that the scope of the privilege avail-
able to the public should not determine that available to the press because the free
press right is not personal to the media, but is designed to serve the public's right to
know; thus, "the prohibition of visits by the public has no practical effect upon their
right to know beyond that achieved by the exclusion of the press." 417 U.S. 841
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Before the Supreme Court struck down the restrictive press visitation rule,
a federal district court in California had reached a contrary result in a companion
case to Pell v. Procunier, not on the basis of freedom of the press claim advanced
by plaintiff journalists, but on the basis of freedom of speech claims by plaintiff
prisoners. Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196, 202-05 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Relying
on Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (1973), a Ninth Circuit
case upholding a restrictive press visitation rule, the Hillery court found that the
disputed regulation imposed no prior restraint or restriction on publishing and that the
resultant burden on news reporting was uncertain; it held that in the interests of
prison security a ban on face-to-face interviews was reasonable provided some access
to information within prisons was available. 364 F. Supp. at 199-200. Thus, these
courts adopted the view that the regulations need be only "rationally related to the
achievement of legitimate goals of prison administration." 480 F.2d at 1066. But see
notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra; 417 U.S. at 862-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57. The First Circuit recently raised and simultaneously rejected the possibility
that there may not be a right of access at all and that the press might be excluded
entirely. McMillan v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1974), aff'g 369 F. Supp. 1182
(D. Mass. 1973).
58. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 20
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States Congress59 and the press section of the Alabama state legislature."C
The question of whether newsreporters have a right in the first instance
to galleries set aside specially for the press was not an issue in either
case; each concerned due process and equal protection claims quite apart
from a bare right of special access. Though press galleries do provide
special privileges and benefits61 not afforded by admission to public galler-
ies, 62 the conclusion cannot be drawn from the cases that special galleries
are mandated by the constitution.63 Thus, the legislative gallery cases, on
their face, are consistent with the traditional principle that there is no
right of special access.
In Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n,6 4 the plain-
tiffs applied for admission to the defendant association,6 5 whose members
had access to the periodical press gallery of Congress. Pursuant to the
rules governing that gallery, the application was rejected because Consumer
Reports, a consumer-oriented publication of the Consumers Union, was
not "owned and operated independently of any industry, business, asso-
ciation, or institution .... "66 The court found that to the extent that a
limitation upon the content of news results from a burden on newsgathering,
the rule abridged freedom of the press.6 7 Moreover, since there was
no evidence in the legislative history that the rule served a compelling
state interest, and since the application of the rule was based upon no
precise standards, the rule was arbitrary and unnecessary. 68
In Lewis v. Baxley,69 news representatives were denied admission to
both the press and public galleries of the Alabama state legislature because
59. Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18
(D.D.C. 1973).
60. Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
61. For example, members of the Periodical Correspondents' Association are
provided with special seating in the periodical press galleries; they do not have to
compete for seating in the public galleries. They are provided typewriters and tele-
phones and four administrators to maintain their facilities. Correspondents have access
to the Senate President's Room and the House Speaker's Lobby where they may
arrange for interviews. In addition, they. are provided press tables during public
congressional committee meetings, and have been granted exclusive permission to
attend daily press conferences held by the Senate leadership and the Speaker of the
House. 365 F. Supp. at 21-22.
62. Courts have usually taken the position that "[ilt is of no significance in the
constitutional sense that the plaintiffs may have occupied a place on the Senate floor,
as distinguished from the gallery, as a matter of 'privilege' and not as a matter of
strict legal right." Kovach v. Maddox, 238 F. Supp. 835, 844-45 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
63. However, the right of the press to have access to open sessions and pro-
ceedings of Congress is undisputed. Id. at 845.
64. 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973).
65. The Periodical Correspondents' Association, composed of newsreporters
approved for admission to the separate gallery for periodical representatives, is em7-
powered by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Speaker of the
House to pass upon applications for admission and otherwise to administer the facilities.
Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id. at 25-26.
68. Id. at 25, citing Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), and Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
69. 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973),
NOVEMBER, 19741
9
Malmgren: Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Freedom of the Press to Ga
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
they refused to file statements of economic interest as required by an
Alabama statute7" governing ethics of public officers in the state. In
answer to the defendant's contention that the statute was designed to
protect the public from interested and improperly influenced news coverage,
the couft responded that such an interest was not only insubstantial, but
probably not legitimate.71 Regarding the assertion that the statute served
the state's interest in "protection of the legislature from surreptitious lobby-
ing newsmen," the court concluded that, assuming such an interest was
substantial, requiring detailed economic disclosure from the press or any
single occupational group bore no substantial relation to that valid interest.
72
The significance of the Lewis case lies not in its conclusion, but in its
dicta. On the facts, the court held that where the state seeks to exclude
one or more members of the press from areas or occasions to which other
members of the press are admitted, the state must show a substantial
nexus between the action and the asserted paramount state interest.
73
In dicta, while reaffirming the traditional principle that the same test
applies when the state seeks to bar journalists from areas to which the
general public is admitted, 74 the court posited that where the public is
generally excluded, the state need show only a reasonable nexus with a
legitimate interest to exclude the press. 75 In holding that reporters have
a limited right of reasonable access to legitimate items of news,76 the court
conceded that there may be occasions when the press may claim a con-
stitutionally protected right to gather news where the public is excluded.
However, it is difficult to imagine under what factual circumstances
such a test would inure to the benefit of the press, for so long as it is
reasonable to exclude all members of the public, presumably it will be
reasonable to exclude all members of the press. The test is particularly
troublesome when measured against the holdings of those lower courts
70. Section 14 of the Alabama statute governing ethics reads in part:
Members of the press who cover the State Legislature or state government in
any way . . . prior to being admitted to galleries, press rooms, committee meet-
ings, any space set aside for use of the press, the floor of the legislature, or press
conferences . . . shall file a statement of economic interests . . . and shall have been
approved by the State ethics commission for a special press pass . . . . The state-
ment of economic interest . . . shall . . . include the names of all newspapers or
publications, radio stations, or news-gathering organizations by which they are
employed, and what other occupations or employment they may have, if any;
and they shall further declare that they are not employed in any legislative or
executive department of government, and that they are not employed, directly or
indirectly, by any person or corporation having legislation before the State Legis-
lature, and that they will not become so engaged in any of these activities while
covering the State Legislature or state government.
ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(21) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
71. 368 F. Supp. at 779.
72. Id. at 780.
73. Id. at 779.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 777.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
disposed to find a press right to face-to-face interviews with prisoners.77
Read narrowly, the language in Lewis would require that since prisons
are not open to the general public, the burden would fall upon the press
to show that its exclusion was unreasonable. Against the broad assertion
that the state's substantial interest in security and discipline is reasonably
served by a blanket exclusion, such a burden would be difficult to meet.
V. AN EMERGING COMPROMISE
A resolution may turn upon a matter of policy. Because of the
expanding role of the press in an increasingly complex society, it may not
be enough to assure the press that it will not be excluded from those places
or occasions where the average citizen may go. The interest of a well-
informed public, which is served by rigorous protection of freedom of the
press, requires a more flexible approach towards the efforts of the press
to obtain information about or through the government.
It is to be expected that the courts will respond with caution to
increasing pressure to expand press rights beyond the scope normally asso-
ciated with freedom of expression. 78 That it has been held that a qualified
privilege will be granted where a reporter who refuses to disclose his
confidential sources is not a party to the action and where certain safe-
guards are lacking,79 demonstrates judicial reluctance to disregard totally
the proposition that granting to the press newsgathering rights that are
merely coextensive with freedom of speech rights is not inadequate to
allow the press to serve its vital function in our society.80 Notwithstanding
the Supreme Court's disposition8 l of first amendment claims in prisoner
interview cases,8 2 the history of judicial debate illustrates a continuing
ambivalence over whether the constitution mandates, or even permits,
preferential treatment of the press in some circumstances. The treatment
of the issue in the legislative gallery cases83 was less tentative because
questions of discrimination, and not the more basic question whether the
press generally could be denied access to sessions of the legislature, were:
addressed there. However, the appealingly simple delineation of first.
amendment tests in Lewis v. Baxley,8 4 underscores the continuing diffi-
culty encountered by the courts with the notion of a newsgathering right:
peculiar to the press.
77. See notes 48 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
78. The traditional approach of the courts has been to treat freedom of speech.
and freedom of the press under the general rubric of freedom of expression. For a.
discussion of the impact of that approach upon an analysis of a newsgathering right,.
see Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUm. L. Rxv. 838,.
840-45 (1971).
79. See notes 15-28 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 60 supra.
81. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Section II of the text.
83. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
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Among those cases discussed above, the results which obtained in
Washingtodn Post v. Kleindienst 5 and Houston Chronicle v. Kleindiensts'
suggest a solution that is a palatable compromise between, on the one
hand, denying the press any preferential treatment and, on the other,
attempting to define those areas or occasions wherein the press should have
an absolute right of access regardless of the circumstances. The press would
not have a special right merely because a named or specified individual has
been granted access; however, the press would be given an equal right of
access where generic categories of the public are admitted. Thus, where
a member of congress grants an exclusive interview with only certain
constituents the press would not have the same right of access. However,
where the same member of congress arranges for a meeting with, for
example, all manufacturers of office machines, the press also would be
admitted.
As foreseen in the Branzburg opinion, 7 determinations will have to
be made as to who is entitled to claim a press newsgathering right. For
example, press definitions are used routinely by the police for the issuance
of passes,88 are incorporated as exemptions in lobbying statutes,8 9 and are
used in visitation rules of penal institutions.90 These definitions and others
will have to be examined on a case-by-case basis; limitations upon the basis
of such factors as frequency of publication, circulation, and mailing priv-
ileges, among others, will have to meet constitutional standards. Further,
consideration will have to be given to the required credentials for free-
lance writers and book authors. In all these determinations, since the
foundation of a special newsgathering right inheres' in its educative role,
the extent to which the press performs that function will be central. Pre-
sumably, the courts are well-equipped with the traditional principles of
freedom of expression to deal with the potential extant in any press classifi-
cation scheme for the evils of discrimination and prior restraint.
VI. CONCLUSION
In theory, the press exists for the benefit of the public; it serves as an
outlet for expression and as a funnel of information to the populace. To
the extent that these facilitating functions are served, press rights, under
certain circumstances, may demand qualitatively unique protections. If
Ifreedom from prior restraint is to have any practical significance for the
,press and, in turn, for the public, newsgathering activities may have to
-receive special constitutional consideration. Judicial ambivalence in the
85. 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
86. 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
88. See generally Hurst, supra note 5, at 194. See also Quad-City Community
News Serv. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
89. See, e.g., Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1970).
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